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Policy Makers
Chanchal Kumar Sharma,  Department of Political  Science,  Maharaja
Agrasen  College  (H.  No-61  0  Sector-1?  HUDA,  Jagadhri-13500,
Haryana India. (email: siddhantchanchal@rediffmail.com). in his paper
demonstrates that in order for fiscal decentralisation to be effective, it
must be approached federally. A federal approach is not a decentralised
approach  but  a  dynamically  balanced  approach;  one  that  constantly
keeps  on  adjusting  the  contrasting  forces  of  centralisation  and
decentralisation to create a system that can ensure good governance in
accordance  with  the  rapidly  changing  global  and  local  scenario.
According to the author, the good governance of the present time has to
be federally flexible and dynamically decentralised and institutions of
fiscal federalism are crucial for achieving such a dynamic equilibrium.
Fiscal decentralisation cannot be detached from the broader principles
of fiscal federalism if it is to be successful, irrespective of the fact of
whether it is being carried out in a federal or non-federal country. He
argues that too much decentralisation or an overly strong central federal
government precludes the survival of a constitutional federal state.
INTRODUCTION
Beginning in the  1990s, decentralisation  and local government reform
have  become  amongst  the  most  widespread  trends  in  development
(World  Bank,  2000)  which  Shah  (2004:3)  calls  a  "silent  revolution
sweeping  the  globe."  Central  governments  around  the  world  are
decentralising fiscal, political and administrative responsibilities to lower
level governments and to the private sector (Dillinger, 1994). This trend,
according  to  Ter-Minassian  (1997),  is  evident  not  only  in  federal
countries but also in many unitary countries including some that have a
long  tradition  of  centralist  government.  According  to  Shah  (2004:3),
"the vision of a governance structure that is slowly taking hold through
this silent revolution is the one that indicates a gradual shift from unitary
constitutional structures to federal or confederal forms of governance
for a majority of people." Thus the federal structure of governance has
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come under sharp focus. This paper seeks to deal with the conceptual
questions of centralisation and decentralisation within a federal form of
government. It suggests that for fiscal decentralisation to be successful
it must be approached federally (even if the country in question is not
an  officially  declared  federal  state).  The federal  approach  means'  a
balanced approach between the contrasting forces of centralisation and
decentralisation.
But  there  is  a  lack  of  clear  understanding  regarding  the
'overlapping'  concepts  of  federalism  and decentralisation.  Some see
little difference between 'federalism and decentralisation' or 'federalism
and devolution.' Although there are similarities between these concepts,
they should be defined precisely and should not be confused with one
another  as  there  are  dangers  inherent  in  poorly  defined  concepts.'
Schneider (2003:7) states, "Two problems tend to arise with concepts
given varied meanings. The concept can be associated with too many
meanings (over specified) or too few (underspecified). Either extreme
produces conceptual muddle and causal uncertainty, as observers can
approach the concept  by delimiting the meanings and indicators that
match  their  belief  system"  (p.7).  Thus  it  is  important  to  clarify  the
conceptual contours.
This  paper  is  structured  as  follows:  Section  I  looks  into  the
perceived advantages of federal structure that have traditionally lent it
much theoretical  strength. In recent times, when central governments
are trying  to  reduce their  role  in  managing  development  and  relying
more on local governments, academics have been led to reconsider if
new solutions are to be developed in policy areas concerned with long
term  change  and  stepwise  internalisation  of  externalities.  Section  II
deals with the overlapping concepts of federalism and decentralisation
in order to demystify conceptual confusion surrounding the difference in
meaning  and  scope  of  these  terms  A  clear  understanding  of  the
concept  is  one  of  the  most  critical  prerequisite  for  translating
decentralisation from theory to practice. Section III demonstrates this by
taking the example of the European Union (EU) as to how centralising
and decentralising forces interact  in a federalizing system to strike a
balance thus ensuring good governance. Section IV further extends the
discussion  by emphasizing  that  institutional  arrangements  related  to
fiscal  federalism  are  crucial  for striking  such  a  balance,  thus
emphasising  that  it  is  fiscal  decentralisation  that  is  the  most  salient
federal  institution.  After  stressing  the  significance  of  fiscal
decentralisation,  section  V  suggests  that  the  attempt  to  implement
fiscal decentralisation must take into account the broader principles of
the political economy of fiscal federalism. Ignoring these principles can
lead to decentralisation failure. Section VI examines one such principle
i.e. 'a strong centre' in detail. 
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Section VII finally highlights how the strong centre of the 21st century
will  be different  from the one that  existed in  the earlier  paradigm of
governance structure.
I
THE FEDERAL APPROACH:
COMBINING THE BEST OF UNITY AND AUTONOMY
Alexis de Tocqueville wrote in Democracy in America that "the federal
system  was  created  with  the  intention  of  combining  the  different
advantages  which  result  from  the  magnitude  and  the  littleness  of
nations" (Tocqueville, 1990: 163). Thus the federal system is concerned
with  combining  the political  and economic  advantages  of  unity while
preserving the valued identity of the sub national units.
The political advantage of unity is 'security.' This security can be of
many  kinds;  "security  against  foreign  danger;  security  against
contentions and wars among the different States; guard against those
violent and oppressive factions which embitter the blessings of liberty,
and against those military establishments which must gradually poison
its very fountain." (Madison, quoted in Cooke, 1961 :308)
The  economic  advantages  of  unity  are  those  that  result  from
'operating  within  a  common  market'  (that  have  become  a  serious
concern in the context of globalisation and the market economy2). In
addition to this the centralised provision of certain services (that can be
provided less expensively on a larger scale or their benefits may spill
over  across  districts)  creates  economies  of  scale  and  captures
externalities  (but  at  the  cost  of  imposing  a  common  policy  on
populations with varied preferences and priorities).
Similarly political  advantages of  sub-national  flexibility  are that  it
"fosters  greater  responsiveness  of  policy  makers  to  the  will  of  the
citizenry and results in a closer congruence between public preferences
and public policy. It promotes diversity in public choices. It  enhances
democratic values and provides the opportunity for people at the local
level  to  define  and  debate  the  problems  facing  their  area.  It  also
protects democracy through assuring countervailing centres of power
and influence in a plural society" (Wolman,1990:32).
Economic  advantages  of  decentralisation  are  allocative  and
production  efficiency.  It  has  been  argued  that  the  role  of  local
governments in allocation is substantial and thus allocative efficiency is
maximised  under  highly  decentralised  political  structures  (Smoke,
1994:28).3  Another  economic  advantage  is  that  under  the  local
people's  scrutiny,  production  efficiency  of  local  public  goods  and
services such as water supply, solid waste collection, sewerage works,
refuse disposal and public transport could be maximised (Wolman, 
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1990:30-1; Campbell  et al.,  1991: 6). It is to be noted that there are
trade-offs in uniting the two principles of central government control and
local flexibility. On the one hand, to achieve the gains stemming from
unity, autonomy is to be restrained and on the other hand, to realise the
gains  emerging  from autonomy,  central  government  control  is  to  be
relaxed  in  addition  to  granting  independent  financial  powers  to  sub-
national levels to enable them to fulfil  their responsibilities and also to
increase government's accountability.  In fact the appeal  of federalism
lies  in  the  fact  that  it  provides  enough  opportunities  to  resolve  this
trade-off to arrive at the optimality.
In  fact,  the  trade-off  between  autonomy  and  efficiency  forms  the
basis of the federal approach to governance. Federalism is a system that
strikes a balance between these two tendencies or trade-offs. According
to  Riker  (1975:113-4),  "federalism  is  an  outcome  of  rational  bargain
among  various  constituents.  The  bargain  may  be  for  political  or
economic gains. In the political bargain, the constituents give up political
autonomy for security from external threat. The economic bargain is to
enable  a  common  market  and  to  ensure  optimal  provision  of  public
services  by  reaping  economies  of  scale  and  catering  to  diverse
preferences."  This  kind  of  arrangement  implies  the  existence  of  both
forms  of  administration  (centralised  and  decentralised).  Thus  the
paradox at the heart of all federal systems is that federalism is designed,
as the late Elazar (1966: 2) put it, for both "self rule and shared rule," In
the words of Watts (1998:133), "...in the context of contemporary global
scene, federal political systems, combining shared rule and self rule do
provide a practical way of combining the benefits of unity and diversity
through representative institutions... federal arrangements and the idea
of  federalism  have  shown  that  they  can  provide  a  means  for
reconciliation in the world. The challenge for scholars is to contribute, by
critical, objective and comparative analysis, to a better understanding of
how new federal  systems may be  established or  existing  ones  made
more effective. "
Coexistence of both forms of administration is a vindication of the
consensus  since  the  1980s  that  excess  of  centralisation  or  absolute
local autonomy, cannot only seriously compromise the principle of unity
in diversity or that of combining shared rule with self rule but can also
lead to inefficiencies. In the former case, the minimum winning coalition
within a legislature will come to determine the provision of public goods
and in the latter case sub-national governments will compete for scarce
capital by lowering their capital taxes and public goods level below the
efficient  levels.  The  federal  approach  to  governance  seeks  to  derive
conditions for resolving a trade-off between these two inefficiencies and
the conditions under which both regional and central governments 
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should  provide  public  goods.  Oates  (1972:  14)  compares  the
alternatives of a centralised and decentralised government in terms of
their  ability  to  deliver  the  three  tasks  (stabilisation,  redistribution  and
allocation) identified for the public sector by Musgrave (1959). He argues
that both the options of centralised and decentralised government have
relative advantages and disadvantages, so the optimal system would be
one  that  combines  the  strengths  of  both  while  avoiding  their
weaknesses: "a federal organisation of government meets this need."
II
FEDERALISM AND DECENTRALISATION
Economists  like  Boucher  and  Migue  (2002:2)  have  flatly  stated,
"federalism is decentralisation." Thus, to them supporters of devolution
are real federalists.  Similarly, Dafflon (1992) argues that in federalism,
centralisation is seen basically as negative policy measure. Supporting
this view is  another  economist,  Lee (1994:75),  who talks  of  restoring
fiscal federalism in the US which in his opinion "can only be achieved by
dramatic decentralisation in the power to tax." Thus follows his extreme
proposal  for  reverse  revenue  sharing.  Similarly,  federalism  has  been
regarded as "a critical theoretical component of decentralism" by Gerring
et  al.  (2004),  thus  reinforcing  the  federal-decentralised  vs  unitary-
certralised dichotomy.4 On the other hand, in the conventional debate in
Canada and Europe, federalism is associated with strengthening central
government's  powers,  while  the  search  for  autonomy  and
decentralisation is  linked  to narrow secessionist  movements  and anti-
European options.
But  both  the  views  ignore  the  fact  that  the  subject  matter  of
federalism  is  neither  centralisation  nor  decentralisation.  Federalism is
concerned with striking the right  balance between the two tendencies.
Lijphart argues that decentralisation and federalism do not always mean
the same thing.
Thus  it  is  clear  that  a  federal  political  system  cannot  be
distinguished  from a  non-federal  political  system  on  the  basis  of  the
degree  and  extent  of  decentralisation.  What  distinguishes  a  federal
political system from a decentralised non federal lunitary system is not
just  the  scope  of  decentralised  responsibilities  but  the  constitutional
guarantee  of  autonomy  for  the  constituent  governments  in  the
responsibilities they perform. Elazar (1981:34) has therefore preferred to
describe  federations  as  "noncentralised"  on  the  grounds  that
decentralisation implies a hierarchy with power flowing from the top or
centre, whereas non-centralisation suggests a constitutionally structured
dispersion of power, better representing the  essential character  of 
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federations.  Generally  it  is  claimed  that  this  broad  characteristic
distinguishes federations from unitary systems. This does not mean that
all  the federal  systems on the one hand and the unitary system on the
other  are  structurally  similar.  In  fact  there  is  considerable  institutional,
political  and cultural diversity within these two types. As Nathan (1992)
has  pointed  out,  there  is  in  practice  enormous  variation  among
federations  in  the  extent  of  the  powers,  responsibilities  and  resources
assigned to the different levels of government.  Among multiple indices,
not all of equal weight, to be considered are the distribution of legislative
and  administrative  jurisdiction,  the  allocation  of  financial  resources,
decentralisation to non governmental agencies,  constitutional  limitations
and  degrees  of  participation  by  the  constituent  unit  governments  in
federal decision making.
A  federal  political  system  thus  is  not  always  coterminous  with  a
decentralised  system  and  should  be  viewed  as  making  continuous
adjustments over the centralisation or decentralisation continuum due to
their own 'endogenous' reasons. This strand views decentralisation as a
complex  process  that  is  a  product  of  many  factors  including  cultural
heritage and geography. Tocqueville (1990: 114) wrote "it is as impossible
to  determine  beforehand,  with  any  degree  of  accuracy,  the  share  of
authority  which  each  of  two  governments  to  enjoy,  as  to  foresee  all
incidents in the existence of a nation." While studying the centralisation-
decentralisation  tilt  in  federal  systems,  Watts  (1998)  argued  that  the
interactions of social, political, economic and ethnic factors have shaped
institutional  structures  and  political  processes  in  such  a  way  as  to
produce  trends  towards  centralisation  in  some  federal  systems  and
decentralisation in others. In fact, it is not entirely exceptional to find that
in practice,  some federations for their own reasons may decide to give
more  powers  to  the  centre  while  others  will  attribute  the  majority  of
authority  to  their  constituent  units.  Thus,  due  to  some  endogenous
reasons  some federations remain highly centralised while others remain
much  decentralised.  Therefore  an  analogy  between  federal  and
decentralised nations could be erroneous, while "it is appropriate to view
federalism as a process of unifying power within the cluster of states and
decentralising power within the unified state" (Ariyo, 2003:2). Federalism
thus is not a fixed allocation of spheres of central and provincial autonomy
or  a  particular  set  of  distribution  of  authority  between  governments.
Rather, it is a process, structured by a set of institutions, through which
authority is distributed and redistributed. In the words of Wheare (1963:
117), "there is and can be no final solution to the allocation of financial
resources  in  a  federal  system.  There  can  only  be  adjustments  and
reallocations in the light of changing conditions." Federations have 
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evolved as ongoing incomplete contracts (Hart, 1988; Seabright, 1996) and
by their very nature are under constant renegotiation. Viewing federations
as incomplete co.1tracts does to some extent help in solving the puzzle as
to why some mature federations like Australia,  the US and Canada are
evolving  towards  more  centralisation  when  there  is  an  increasing  trend
towards decentralisation in developing countries. The insight yielded by the
new  institutional  economics  (North,  1990)  -  that  the  motivations  and
incentives  of  economic  agents,  and  the  options  available  to  them,  are
influenced in a fundamental sense by the incompleteness of contracts may
throw considerable light on such evolution.
Thus in federal governance decentralisation is not considered as an
alternative to centralisation. Both are considered necessary. The greatest
challenge is to strike a balance. That is why the UNDP(1999:3) report on
decentralisation says that  use of the term "decentralised governance" is
more appropriate rather than the term "decentralisation."
III
BALANCING CENTRALISATION AND DECENTRALISATION:
FEDERAL DYNAMISM OR FEDERAL DILEMMA?
The  idea  of  balancing  the  contrasting  forces  of  centralisation  and
decentralisation  is  central  to  the  concept  of  federalism.  These  two
movements  are  at  work  in  the  European  Union.  The  notion  of  fiscal
federalism  as  a  predominantly  centralising  (unifying)  force  led  to  the
emergence  of  an  integrated  European'  Union  in  November  1993.  The
Maastricht Treaty of November 1993 conferred important new powers on
the European Parliament including co-decision making on legislation. This
creation and evolution of a new top level of government in Europe in the
context  of  European  Monetary  Integration  has  significant  spatial
consequences in which national factors are gradually losing relevance with
the  vanishing  of  old  borders  and redistribution  of  roles  at  national  and
regional  levels.  The  biggest  riddle  according  to  Inman  and  Rubinfelds
(1992:654)  is  "the  future  of  the  national  governments  of  the  member
states."  However,  on the other hand, the 'subsidiarity principle' was also
formally  adopted as a quasi-constitutional  rule  through Article  3b of  the
Maastricht-Treaty-which  stipulates  that  the  powers  of  EU institutions  be
limited to those functions that cannot be adequately performed by member
states. More recently, while the notion that monetary policy be centralised
has gained acceptance among the Europeans, the idea to centralise fiscal
policy in the European Union (EU) has generally been rejected. Thus there
are contrasting forces of centralisation and decentralisation at work.
All  this  has  generated  a  lot  of  rethinking  on  the  implications  of
economic integration within the European Union for thefiscal structure of 
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the EU specifically and on the concept of fiscal federalism more generally.
The contradictions emerging from the working of contrasting forces, some
leading  towards  greater  centralisation  and  others  towards  greater
decentralisation which are at the heart of fiscal federalism have become
more pronounced than ever in the context of new global economic order.
This phenomenon is not restricted to the EU but is also to be seen in those
countries  which  are  moving  towards  a  market  economy  after  failure  of
centralised planning, in the context of 'globalisation.'
The dilemma of balancing the contrasting forces of centralisation and
decentralisation that is inherent in the very dynamics of federalism, is more
pronounced in the developing and transitional countries - the nations that
are  trying  to  stabilise  their  economies  while"...  trying  to  invest  more
decision  making  power  in  populations  that  have  long  been
disenfranchised"  (Bahl,  1995:  1) and thus ideally  trying to "combine the
advantages  of  magnitude  and  littleness  of  nations"  (Tocqueville,  1990:
163).  In  consequence,  they  are  confronted  with  the  predicament  of
resolving  the  trade  off  between  autonomy  and  efficiency  signifying  a
movement towards decentralisation and centralisation respectively.
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that decentralisation should not
be considered as an alternative to centralisation.  Both are needed. The
complementary  roles  of  national  and  subnational  actors  should  be
determined by analysing the most effective ways and means of ~chieving a
desired objective. For example, a national road system should be designed
with both local input and national coordination. Foreign policy should be a
national  function  based  on  the  views  of  the  citizenry.  Solid  waste
management  should  primarily  be  dealt  with  through  local  mechanisms
(UNDP, 1999).
Thus the right degree of decentralisation, according to Wildasin (1996),
depends  on  what  it  is  we  are  considering  decentralising  and  on  the
particular  economic,  historical,  political  and  other  circumstances  within
which decentralisation is contemplated. The crucial issue, says Wildasin, is
to identify which level  of decentralisation is appropriate  for each kind of
activity. It just does not make much sense to hope for any sort of bottom-
line  presumption  in  favour  of  "more  centralisation"  or  "more
decentralisation." But it is regrettable, says Shah (2004:1) that the debate
in  development  policy  triggered  by  the  rekindling  of  interest  in  fiscal
rearrangements and re-examination of the respective roles of the levels of
government  "has  focused  on  the  straw  men  of  centralisation  vs
decentralisation."
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IV
FISCAL FEDERALISM:
MAKING ADJUSTMENTS OVER THE CONTINUUM
Given that the dynamics of the federal approach to governance lies in its
ability  to  balance  the  contrasting  forces  of  centralisation  and
decentralisation,  it  can further  be argued that  it  is  the fiscal  side of  the
federalism (fiscal federalism) that is crucial for striking the right balance, for
it is finance that is the life blood of the government. It is no surprise then
that  fiscal  federalism  literature  is  far  away  from  the  centralisation  vs
decentralisation  focus  and  is  particularly  concerned  with  clarifying
assignment  of  responsibilities  among  different  levels  of  government  in
support of good governance.
In  common  parlance  political  and  constitutional  aspects  (e.g.  giving
citizens or their elected representatives more power in political  decision-
making, establishment of subnational political entities for decision making
and making them politically accountable to local  electorates which often
entails constitutional or statutory reforms like providing for representation
of the member states, the strengthening of legislatures,  creation of local
political  units  along  with  the  encouragement  of  effective  public  interest
groups  and  pluralistic  political  parties)  are  considered  crucial  for
federalism.  Dillinger and Webb (1999)5,  while  giving more preference to
political  decentralisation  (though without  ignoring  fiscal  decentralisation),
use political decentralisation as synonymous -to federalism. Yet Lane and
Ersson (1997) in a striking study, conclude that it is fiscal decentralisation
rather than the political one that is  the  most salient federal institution. In
their opinion, even though a constitutionally recognised regional autonomy
makes the theoretical case for federalism, in practice it has no sense in
case  regions  lack  financial  resources.  A  few  scholars  (Azfar  et  al.,
1999:28)  have  raised  the  question  regarding  the  relative  importance  of
various  factors  contributing  towards  meaningful  decentralisation.  Others
(Yilmaz and Ebel, 2002) recognise the importance of fiscal decentralisation
which, according to them, is crucial for intergovernmental restructuring. But
the  step  towards  fiscal  decentralisation  has  been  a  bit  sketchy  when
compared to a great deal of political decentralisation in the 1990s. This can
be largely explained by the fact that it  takes time for systems to change
from a long-lasting centralisation to decentralisation. While  it is easier to
achieve  political  decentralisation,  building  institutions  for  fiscal
decentralisation takes time.
Gates describes fiscal federalism as a "general  normative  framework
for the assignment of functions to different levels of government and 
178
appropriate fiscal instruments for carrying out these functions.. .It explores,
both in  normative and positive terms, the roles of  the different  levels of
government and the ways in which they relate to one another through such
instruments  as  intergovernmental  grants"  (Gates,  1999:  1120-1  ).  This
definition lends support to the idea that 'the balancing act' that is so crucial
to federal organisation of government, is best performed by fiscal federal
arrangement.
In  fact,  centralisation-decentralisation  is  a  continuum,  rather  than  a
dichotomy and federalism is a special case. Fiscal federalism is concerned
with making continuous adjustments over this continuum and exploring the
respective roles  of  the different  levels of  the government  and assigning
responsibilities and fiscal instruments to the proper levels of government
(of course not to be fixed once and for all). It is concerned with ensuring
mutual interaction and coexistence of centralised and decentralised levels
of government.
V
SUCCESSFUL FISCAL DECENTRALISATION:
BRINGING 'FISCAL FEDERALISM' BACK IN
The above discussion shows that  the institutions of fiscal  federalism are
crucial for maintaining centralisation-decentralisation equilibrium. It is to be
realised  that  while  'fiscal  federalism'  is  a  guiding  concept  that  helps  in
designing  the  structure  of  financial  and  broader  relationships  between
central and subordinate levels of the government, 'fiscal decentralisation' is
a process that alters such structure by devolving powers to the lower levels
of  the  government.  Thus  fiscal  decentralisation  is  one  of  the  most
significant principles of fiscal federalism. It however cannot be successfully
implemented while disassociating it from other principles underlying fiscal
federal theory.
The  concept  of  fiscal  federalism  offers  a  wide  variety  of  structural
designs and one has to be clear as to what design one ultimately desires
to  achieve  before  setting  out  on  the  task  of  designing  the  contours  of
decentralisation process. Thus decentralising without the vision of a fiscal
federal  blueprint  is  like  working  without  sight  of  the  goal.  As  Gallagher
(1998:2)  observes,  "before  we  can  think  about  the  nature  of
decentralisation we must consider the nature of the fiscal  arrangements
that  are  desired  i.e.,  before  setting  on  a  path  of  decentralisation  it  is
important  to  have  a  clear  picture  of  the  target  structure  of  fiscal
arrangements.”
Thus  there  are  perils  inherent  in  over-stressing  the  idea  of  fiscal
decentralisation  "in  general"  while  ignoring  other  dimensions  of  political
economy of fiscal federalism6 "in particular country-specific context." Brazil
is an example where states and municipalities have won due to
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overemphasis  on fiscal decentralisation.  They (states and municipalities)
dominate the union and compete among themselves in a disorganised and
predatory  fashion.  The  experience  of  Argentina  shows  that  perversely
structured systems of intergovernmental finance can destabilise the public
sector and economy as a whole. Another instance is Bosnia Herzegovina.
The  country  adopted  a  federalist  structure  under  the  Dyton  Peace
Agreement.  But  the  agreement  seriously  compromised  some  basic
principles of "fiscal  federalism" and powers of the centre with respect to
subcentral  units  were highly curtailed.  The state (centre)  now faces the
challenge of carrying out even its minimal responsibilities, since it relies on
transfers from the entities.
Thus an improper attempt at fiscal decentralisation could be a disaster-
prone  strategy  while  the  "proper"  distribution  of  tax  authority  and
expenditure responsibility is an extremely complex issue. The problem in
many cases according to Prud'homme (1995) is not what to decentralise
(or whether a service should be provided by a central,  regional  or local
government) but, rather how to organise the joint production (shared rule)
of  the  service  by  various  levels.  The  riddle  can  be  solved  only  if  a
comprehensive  view  of  the  political  economy  of  fiscal  federalism  is
considered instead of a narrow approach to fiscal decentralisation. Since
success of decentralisation depends on its design, an overall improvement
in the political, fiscal and administrative institutions of decentralisation is a
precondition  before  embarking  on  the  path  of  decentralisation.  "But
decentralisation is often implemented haphazardly. Decision makers do not
always fully control the pace and genesis of the decentralisation process"
(World Bank, 2000: 107). Thus what is required is that decentralisation as
it is understood and pursued in recent times must not be detached from a
broader  and  constantly  expanding  perspective  on  fiscal  federalism,  the
intellectual  lineage  of  which  can  only  offer  a  framework  for  successful
decentralisation.
The market-based decentralisation as it is understood today is a recent
phenomenon and has its origin in the development ideology of the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The re-emergence of modern-
day  decentralisation  can  be  traced  back  to  1961,  when  Cambridge
University  hosted  a  conference  on  decentralisation  which  was  closely
followed  by  the  meeting  of  the  United  Nations  Working  Group  on
Decentralisation  inthe  same year.  These  were  probably  the  first  formal
attempts  made  by  academicians  and  practitioners  alike  to  discuss  the
conceptual  and practical issues relating to the notion of decentralisation.
However, after the passage of four decades, there still remains confusion
surrounding  what  the  concept  actually  stands  for  both  in  theory  and
practice.
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The conceptual framework of fiscal decentralisation is well established
in  fiscal  federalism  literature,  drawing  largely  on  the  contributions  by
Musgrave and Oates to the understanding of  which is further expanding
with  the  emerging  second  generation  theory  of  fiscal  federalism  with
important contributions from In man and Rubinfelds (1992, 1997), and Oian
and Weingast  (1996, 1997).  The central  logic  is that  the core issues of
growth and poverty (the justification offered for economic reforms across
the  globe  after  failure  of  the  earlier  paradigms)  cannot  be  addressed
without addressing efficiency-supplying services up to the point at which, at
the margin, the welfare benefit to society matches its cost.
Though  the  conceptual  framework  of  fiscal  decentralisation  is  well
established in fiscal federalism literature there is no set of prescribed rules
for fiscal decentralisation. Bahl (1999: i-ii), however, on the basis of best
practices in fiscal federalism delineates 12 rules for fiscal decentralisation
which are well grounded in the theory of fiscal federalism. These are:
1. Fiscal decentralisation should be viewed as a comprehensive
system.
2. Finance follows function.
3. There must be a strong central ability to monitor and evaluate
decentralisation.
4. One intergovernmental system does not fit the urban and rural
sectors.
5. Fiscal decentralisation requires significant local government
taxing powers.
6. Central government must keep the fiscal decentralisation rules
that it makes.
7. Keep it simple.
8. The design of the intergovernmental transfer system must match the
objectives of decentralisation reform.
9. Fiscal decentralisation should consider all the three levels of
government.
10. Impose a hard budget constraint.
11. Recognise that intergovernmental systems are always in
transition and plan for this.
12. There must be a champion for fiscal decentralisation (meaning
that one must defeat very strong centralisation arguments).
To  proceed  with  fiscal  decentralisation  while  detaching  it  from  federal
dimensions  and  political  economy  considerations  inherent  in  fiscal
federalism is no doubt dangerous. At this point it needs to be asserted that
while bringing about fiscal decentralisation in any country (whether unitary
or federal, developing, transitional or industrialised); sight should not be 
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lost  of  the principles  of  the  political  economy of  fiscal  federalism.  While
drawing  attention  to  this  aspect  Boex  (2001  :3)  stresses  that  "fiscal
decentralisation is relevant to all countries, regardless of whether they are
unitary countries, federal countries or confederations." Though the manner
in which the principle will be applied will differ in each case as the unitary
and  federal  governments  provide  different  opportunities  for  fiscal
decentralisation due to divergence in their respective political and legislative
context. However, it must be reasserted that to regain the dynamic stability
inherent in fiscal federalism, there is a need to "put federal back into fiscal
federalism" (Keen, 1998:456) which is notable in decentralisation literature
only by its absence and which has been identified as one cause behind
'decentralisation failure.'
VI
STRONG CENTRE FOR EFFECTIVE FEDERALISM
Most of the studies on the 'centralisation versus decentralisation issue' tilt
heavily  in  favour  of  decentralisation.  Because  decentralisation,  besides
giving  many  other  advantages  may  also  avoid  noted  inefficiencies  of
centralised decision-making such as (a) central officials who lack detailed
information  about  local  tastes  (Hayek,  1948),  (b)  decision-making  by  a
centralised  legislature  may  permit  a  narrow  majority  of  regions  to
expropriate  the  others,  or  generate  norms  of  reciprocity  that  result  in
overspending (Weingast,  1979;  Besley and Coate,  2000),  and (c)  central
government's ability to insure regions against exogenous shocks, increasing
welfare,  will  create  moral  hazard  for  the  regions  (Persson and  Tabellini,
1996). More recent literature suggests that decentralisation, unless carried
out under the aegis of a reasonably strong centre, is doomed to fail. A weak
centre  is  prone to  get  manipulated  by the  strong  coalitions  and interest
groups.  There  is  overwhelming  consensus  that  most  of  the  problems
associated  with  decentralisation  can  be  solved  by  central  government
intervention  and  regulatory  powers  entrusted  in  it  (Cumberland,  1981;
Gordon, 1983; Wildasin, 1989; Rivlin, 1992). While comparing a case of a
strong centre with a weak one, Blanchard and Shleifer (2000), argue that
fiscal decentralisation has been successful in China because the centre in
China is strong enough to restrain destructive behaviour of local interests
and withstand unhealthy local demands. On the other hand the process in
Russia is, at best, just wavering, all because of the weak c.entre. They show
in their study that decentralisation in developing and transitional countries
can lead to the capture of local  governments.  In such cases the authors
argue,  strong  administrative  control  of  the  local  government  by  central
authorities is important for efficient economic decentralisation. Thus for 
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federalism to be effective one of the conditions is that decentralisation must
be balanced with the provision of a strong central government with ability
and  willingness  to  resist  unhealthy  demands  from  lower  levels  of  the
government.  This  argument  endorses  Riker's  (1964)  suggestion  that
centralisation does matter for federalism to be effective. To quote an even
earlier source, Tocqueville writes, "From my perspective, I cannot imagine a
nation that could survive and especially prosper without strong government
centralisation"  (1952:  87).  In  1836  after  living  for  several  months  in
Switzerland he wrote "I have developed such an utter disdain for the federal
constitution of Switzerland, that I would unequivocally term it a league and
not a federation. A government of that nature is certainly the weakest, the
most  impotent,  the clumsiest  and the least  capable of  leading its  people
anywhere except to anarchy that one could imagine. I am also struck by the
lack of  any  vie  politique  in  its  population.  The Kingdom of  England  is  a
hundred times more republican than this republic" (Tocqueville, 1952: 70-1).
Various studies show that fiscal decentralisation may lead to allocative
inefficiencies, as well as poor accountability and governance if expenditures
and  revenue mobilisation functions  are not  properly  assigned across the
different levels of the government (Hommes, 1995; Fukasaku and de Mello,
1999;  World  Bank,  1999).  Hommes  (1995:332)  sees  decentralisation  as
"essentially a political problem" representing, in Latin America for example,
a  stark  departure  from  centuries  of  centralism.  The  success  of
decentralisation may depend upon the existence at the local level of a civic
cultural  tradition-informal  civic  institutions,  such  as  solidarity  and
cooperatives. With a lack of local governmental experience and riddled with
patronage,  local  governments in  Latin  America tend  to be  captive  of  the
elites  and  political  barons.  Thus,  for  Hommes,  an  irony  of  fiscal
decentralisation may be the need for more central government controls to
protect  against  this  danger.  Hommes notes  that  the seeming paradox of
decentralisation  is  that  it  demands  of  the  central  government  more
sophisticated political  control.  Some authors have argued that in the post
Soviet context, greater centralisation is in fact required (Polishchuk, 2000,
Stoner-Weiss,  2001).  Ultimately  effective  decentralisation  requires  the
relinquishing of some central control.
VII
THE NEW 21sT CENTURY ROLE OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
The  emerging  governance  literature  explores  the  kind  of  'sophisticated
control'  that  is  being  considered  more  relevant  than  ever  in  the  current
scenario. This new role of the centre is based on changing paradigms of
governance structure (table-1).
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Table 1
Governance Structure, the 20th Versus the 21st Century
Source: Shah, 2004, p 4
The centre's new role will not be identical to the older one where the central
government played a strong-control and commanding role. As governments
restructure, the role of the centre should be that of "stewardship." Peter Block
argues  that  principles  of  stewardship  bring  a  new  understanding  of
accountability to each act of governance (1993: 27). In this concept, which is
quite  popular  in  the  literature  of  management  and  organisation  in  United
States, trust and service and accountability are emphasised. In the new role,
the central  government,  enables  the regional  governments to  exercise the
newly  devolved  responsibilities,  powers  and  authorities.  In  this  process,
national level institutions are strengthened to provide support to the regional
levels.
In  fact  the  changed  global  economic  and  political  conditions  are
compelling  central  governments  to  look  forward  to  more  involvement  of
regional levels (some authors now prefer to use the word engagement) in the
development  of  national  economic  development  strategies  and  thus  are
attempting to build local capacity. In the emerging borderless world economy
a newer  federalism perspective will  be called for,  because in the times to
come the functions such as "regulation of financial transactions, international
trade,  global  environment  and  international  migration,  corporate  taxation,
stabilisation,  international  conflict  resolution,  surveillance  of  governance
conditions,  transnational  production,  investment  and  technology  transfer
suppression  of  money  laundering,  drug  smuggling  and  terrorism  will
gradually  pass  upwards  i.e.  beyond  nation  states.  The  central  level  of
government will perform tasks such as "oversight and technical assistance
20th Century       21st Century
Unitary
Centralised
Centre manages
Bureaucratic 
Command and Control
Input controls
Top down accountability
Internally dependent
Closed and slow
Intolerance of risk
Federal/Confederal
Globalised and Localised 
Centre leads
Participatory
Responsive and accountable  
Results matter
Bottom up accountability 
Competitive
Open and Quick
Freedom to fail/succeed
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to subnational governments, macroeconomic coordination, social safety nets,
skill  enhancement  for  international  competitiveness,  social  and
environmental  policy  through  international  agreements"  (Shah,  2004:  11).
The task ahead to ensure this is to strengthen national level institutions. A
real test of the strength of the institution is the ability to successfully meld two
goals:  central  authority  and  subcentral  or  decentralised  engagement  and
empowerment to ensure good democratic governance.
New literature on the political economy of fiscal federalism goes far beyond
the earlier issues. Now the case is for the centre to assume sophisticated
styles  of  remaining  'in  charge'  (stewardship/  leadership)  and  constructing
such support structures, processes and national institutions which create an
enabling  environment1  (in  which  subnational  autonomy  is  tolerated  and
treasured),  build  local  capacity  and provide appropriate  incentives  for  the
sub-national governments to behave responsibly while allowing the centre to
perform its new role in changed political and economic conditions. The best
design  for  decentralisation  in  the  last  analysis  will  vary  according  to
circumstances and situations.
NOTES
1. Cognitive linguists like Lakoff (1985) have elaborated on the dangers of poorly defined
concepts.
2. In a two-day seminar on 'Federalism in a Globalising World' in New Delhi on 5 August
2003,  under the joint  auspices of  the National  Institute  of  Public  Finance and Policy
(NIPFP)  and Forum of  Federation,  Ottawa, Canada, the former  RBI  Governor and a
distinguished  economist,  Rangarajan  noted  in  his  presentation  that  in  meeting  the
challenges of globalisation, the Indian federal structure must respond in such a way so
as to create a large common market within the country (The Hindu, 6th August 2003).
3. This distribution of functions and collaboration in allocation between central and local
government is named as the Tiebout-Musgrave layer cake model of the public sector in
the  literature.  The  traditional  fiscal  federalism  paradigm  makes  use  of  Musgravian
tripartite division (like a layer cake) according to which public services can be divided
into  three  functions  (a)  stabilisation  functions,  (b)  redistributive  functions,  and  (c)
allocative  functions.  Musgrave  and  Tiebout  proposed  that  the  distribution  and
stabilisation functions of government should be carried out at national level, while the
allocation role should be performed by state and local governments. This has become
known as the layer cake model of government. The argument for giving the allocation
role to lower levels of government was based on the view that they are more efficient in
the allocation of resources because they provide that mix of outputs which best reflects
individual tastes. Opposed to this is the Marble Cake Model or Cooperative Federalism
Model.  In  this  model  various  levels  of  government  have  overlapping  and  shared
responsibilities and all levels are treated as equal partners in federation.
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4.    It  must  be recalled  that  William  Riker  in  1969 critique  of  federalism  literature
complained  that  scholars  place  too  much  emphasis  on  differences  between
unitary  and  federal  system  and  not  enough  on  the  institutional,  political  and
cultural diversity within these two types.
5.     William Dillinger and Stewen B.Webb (1999) write, “  it is difficult to imagine what
the restoration of  democracy would have been like  without  substantial  political
decentralization—federalism—and  some  concomitant  form  of  fiscal
decentralization”. 
6.    The political economy of a fiscal federation in which spending is decentralized and
taxation is not (as in the Scottish case) is very different from one in which taxation
is  decentralized  as  well(as  in  the  US).  Further  political  economy  of  fiscal
federalism in a developing country attempting to decentralize is different from a
developed country on account  of   the unintended consequences that  relatively
less  developed  institutions  of  accountability,  governance  and  capacity  in
developing countries might have on decentralization policies.
7.      ‘Enabling  environment’  means-  institutions  of  citizen  participation  and
accountability. Anwar Shah adds the notion of – “authorizing environment” which
in his words, “represents the institutional mechanisms to translate constitutional
mission to concrete objectives and actions. These include societal norms, formal
and  informal  rules,  procedures  and  organizations  dealing  with  participation,
consultation,  policy  making  and  accountability.  Legislative  coordination  and
oversight  bodies  are  important  elements  of  authorizing  environment.  These
institutions  ensure  that  public  sector  is  solely  focused  on citizen  aspirations.”
(Shah, 2004, p6).
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